With Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd), Director General, United Service Institution

Sandeep Unnithan: Hello and welcome to the Sandeep Unnithan show, your weekly dose of defence, geopolitics and much more. Today I am honoured to have with me on my show, Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh, former Commanding-in-Chief, Western Naval Command and of course, the current Director General, United Services Institution. Admiral Singh, welcome to my show.

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): Thank you, Sandeep. Always a pleasure. Thanks for taking the time out, Sir.

Sandeep Unnithan: It's been one year since Operation Sindoor, and I can't help but ask you that question. As the man who turned Pakistan into a landlocked state for 88 hours, as the CNC, Western Naval Command, what was going through your mind in those intense 88 hours? Take us into Mumbai, your Ops room, what was going through your mind when you were given the green signal?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): Not too much because it's something we had rehearsed, we had practised, we had prepared for and we're just waiting for the right point and signal either that the other side made the first move or the mistake or we were given the green light and all the actions that we had prepared, rehearsed would have just been put into motion and they would have become fully a landlocked state after that.

Sandeep Unnithan: As smoothly as that, you knew exactly what you had to do?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): We knew what we had to do, even preparing for it, that's the job, the basic job. Look, on the 22nd, when they suckered Sandeep, I was actually in Delhi. I just finished my call on the CNS and the CDS, and I came back to my room, and I switched on the TV, and I saw the dastardly images, and my first call was my Chief of Staff, and I said, go up to red. He says, Sir? I said, switch on the TV, go up to red. This is going to require a very strong, robust response, and this is exactly what we have been preparing for. We've been preparing for the entire spectrum of operations. This, of course, was the higher end, and our ships are out at sea exercising at that time. They completed the exercise, and we commenced the degree of rearming and turning around that needed to be done, and probably the fastest time that we've ever done this and the full fleet, entirely, tri-dimensional was redeployed in a very short time, within five days.

Sandeep Unnithan: But you said you've been preparing for it, for how long were you preparing? Was it your command, your tenure, or was it before that?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): It's a continuum, Sandeep. When you're preparing for it, I'm talking about the Navy and the armed forces are preparing for it. Remember, over the last 10 years, the parameters of preparedness have been changing. Rather, I'll take it further back, and you said take it 25 years back. Post Kargil, under the heady intoxication of thinking they've got nuclear armour, the Pakistanis have been getting more and more adventurous with their favourite troops, which are the terrorists. And post 1912, when the Indian armed forces deployed for a pretty long operation towards coercion, the compellence never came through because of the circumstances and situations since then, there has been this outlook to say, okay, how do you target the terrorist entities specifically? So, they've been planning, and that has been done. You've heard about cold start, proactive operations, and dynamic response strategy; these are all phrases which are variations on how the armed forces will respond and react under a varied set of circumstances. But really fell into place after 2016. That's when, actually, we carried out specific operations. These were carried out at that time as purely surgical strikes by the Army SF. And subsequently, all the armed forces were on stand-by for any escalation if it was required. We had a repeat of that. A couple of years later, by 2019, when we had the Pulwama attacks, and they had the Balakot strikes again, this time led by the Air Force, but all three forces stood to the Western fleet that was deployed out at sea at that particular time. And they reoriented from an exercise scenario into an operational scenario. So, the requirement that you will have to translate from what you will call classically peacetime, or no war, no peace, or low intensity conflict to high intensity immediately, is something that the Navy, at least, has been preparing and planning for more than a decade. And this kind of scenario of what would happen ever since we've been through the kind of military pressures and terrorist threats that we faced over the last decade, there were plans in place for this. And we are prepared and rehearsed for it, not just at the naval level, but at the joint force level. So, the minute that it happened, it was only a question of executing your plans. Right.

Sandeep Unnithan: So, taking you back again to the high seas in 2025. Is it true that there were no Pakistani warships out at patrol, and there were no long-range maritime patrol sorties?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): Between the 7th to 10th, they were not before that; they were there. But even prior to that, immediately after the operations happened, as I told you, we always have a certain number of units which are on deployment. And the deployment was increased, we expanded our actions to develop the maritime domain awareness. And we noticed even then that the amount of activity on the Pakistani side was limited. Within their EZ, they started putting psychological warfare operations through the promulgation of dummy navigation areas. For purportedly carrying out weapon firings by the ships against submarines by aircraft.

Sandeep Unnithan: Were there any weapon firings?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh(Retd): No, there weren't. These are all psychological ops because we are monitoring the ships. So, it was fairly clear that it wasn't there. And it is probably done with the idea to prevent certain kinds of deployments from the Indian Navy side. It helped us in making those deployments because you're tracking all the vessels at a particular time. And we knew exactly which areas that they could carry out firings if they needed to, and where it was purely dummy. But immediately as the strikes took place, whatever little bit of activity they had within their EZ, that's up to 200 nautical miles from the coast, as you know, immediately after the first strikes took place, they all pulled back. And they went back close to the harbours, I'll say they went back into their holes, they tucked their tails and stayed well out of any possible conflict or coming across where inadvertently or by a heady rush of blood, they would take a step which we were prepared and waiting for.

Sandeep Unnithan: So, in 2026, Admiral Singh, you're looking at a maritime blockade that's underway to the west of our waters. Were you prepared for a scenario like Pakistan in 2025? Was that ever an option?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): See, you will get into a lot of doctrinal issues when you talk about a blockade. No blockade works in a short period of time. Remember, the last time we executed a de facto blockade was of then East Pakistan in 1971. These issues take time; how they're planned and done doctrinally is different. Our purpose was to exercise sea control and to ensure that there was sea denial on the other side. And we are prepared that in case the enemy forces strayed or took a step, at that current moment, our orders were to maintain a strong deterrent posture. Deterrence obviously means that I'm putting coercive pressure on them, sending a strategic signal that we're ready to escalate. But we've got the control, and calibrated steps are with us because we've got domain awareness with us. And should they step out of line, then we have the full powers of self-defence to take whatever action is needed. So, we are poised strategically to put that pressure, apply the third front, the third dimension of pressure as and when the escalation threshold is crossed, or they take a step against us, or we are given a higher directive to say, okay, the green light, and we go for it.

Sandeep Unnithan: So, Pakistan sued for peace before that green light was given?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): Yes, Pakistan sued for peace just as the green light was given.

Sandeep Unnithan: So, was there a sense of regret or, you know, we lost an opportunity after so long?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd) :  Let's look at it professionally. At the end of the day, all success or sense of satisfaction has to be seen against the objectives. There are strategic objectives laid down. Our job is to ensure that those strategic objectives are met. When the objectives are met, and the other side is sued for peace, and the national leadership calls it off, that's all there is to it. I'm sure if the other side hasn't taken the correct lessons home, or misreads them, and tries any of these issues again, they will face a more robust response ahead.

Sandeep Unnithan:  You know, there's a phrase in naval terminology called a force in being. Would you explain that for us? And is the Pakistan Navy actually a force in being?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd) : Yes, indeed. Yes, absolutely. A force in being essentially is, as long as that force is in existence, you have to cater for the potential threat from that force. So many times, you have a weaker force that avoids battle, avoids being decimated, so that the potential threat that they could cause in various circumstances remains. So the Pakistani naval forces very much are a force in being; let's not underrate them and their capabilities. And their combat potential, in fact, is growing. Now they've got the new kind of submarine, the Hangor, which has just been commissioned. Yes, just about a week ago. AIP submarine. So, the capabilities are growing. So, we have to cater and plan for the higher potential, combat potential that they have. In the meanwhile, as long as they've avoided battle and they preserve their forces, they remain a force in being. Let's be clear on that.

Sandeep Unnithan:  So, now zooming out a bit from Op Sindhur, Admiral Singh, what are the lessons for Indian conventional war fighting that you've drawn from this? Were there certain platforms or assets that you would require? Are there learnings that would help you fight another, see a larger sea battle in a different dimension?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): Look, any military operation, you'll always look at it very critically. You look at what all could have happened, which didn't happen. So, you'll cater based on a life situation and the contingencies that could have happened. You make those changes to your doctrine, to your deployment, to your technology, to your force levels, of course, the last takes a long time. You relook at your plans and see what needs to be adjusted, and your priorities are a little bit up and down. You do the same, not just for your own experience, but also do it for any other conflict that may be happening in the region. You also would do it for any writings or technological or doctrinal trends that are happening in the region. Challenge, of course, is for the Navy; the timelines are huge. Just as the movement across the seas takes time, building up assets, which are going to operate at sea, takes a decade, and their lives carry on for three to four decades, depending on the size of the platform you're talking about. So, you need to go in for the very long timeline ahead. And hence, you have no other alternative for any professional force, but to constantly keep reviewing what you've achieved, what more may need to be achieved, what the circumstances, the environment or the adversary may do. So that's a continuous ongoing effort.

Sandeep Unnithan: There is this expression that you used, compellence, where the Indian military was used to induce compellence in Pakistan's behaviour. Of course, they asked for a ceasefire, they sued for peace, they asked us to call off the ops. But do you believe that the message has gone down to the Pakistani leadership now? Or are you looking at them being more emboldened with the kind of global support that they've been able to gather over the last couple of months?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): Both are entirely possible. There's no doubt that the message is gone. If the message hadn't gone, they wouldn't have sued for peace at that time. I've said this earlier; they took the best shot. And all that happened is that their hand got fractured. Okay, we are all standing, we are ready. We are in a position where we could have really applied the pressure on them, but our objectives had been met. There's nothing more to be obtained strategically at that particular time. On the other hand, after having learned the lesson, is there a history of the Pakistani side forgetting those lessons very fast? Unfortunately, yes. They have this tendency of being risk takers, almost gamblers, in their history. They're very quick to forget the negative lessons, and try to exaggerate potential positives, find somebody else to blame for it, and get tail under the winds and very quickly, overconfidence creeps in. So, possible overconfidence for any reason on the Pakistani side is very, very much possible. We've seen it happening so many times in the past. If they have to analyse something and say, there's a chance of something going wrong. And the chance of something going wrong is much higher than it going right. He will opt for one of the optimistic kinds. So, for us as a matter of prudence and as a matter of professional practice and preparation, you have to take into account that they may not remember these lessons, and they may turn around and once again, try and do something silly, stupid or perfidious as they've done in the past.

Sandeep Unnithan: So, and of course, the Indian military is prepared for an effective response to that perfidious strategy.

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): Absolutely.

Sandeep Unnithan:  So, Admiral Singh, you know, moving a little eastward away from the west coast, I want to take you down to the Andaman-Nicobar Islands. You have a very interesting, important geoeconomic project that's been planned there, the Great Nicobar Island transhipment port. Tell us why it's so important for India. Do you agree with the importance of this port? How is it?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh(Retd) : Fully. Absolutely. I mean, I'm surprised to find some kind of writings and doubts being thrown upon it. Step back. I mean, the argument right now is it a great economic project? Is it a great military project? Leave both of those two out. It's a great strategic project. World over, you look at choke points and near choke points. And you look at the effect they have on the flow of trade and on your strategic positioning. And that is why if you look at the heydays of the British Empire, they had occupied all the key choke points, Gibraltar, Aden, that's Bab al-Mandab, Singapore, Hong Kong, and the near choke points. What you have represented with the Andamans overlooking where they are, it's an ideally located transhipment point as a near choke point. Now, in times to come, what becomes a transhipment hub depends upon where the trade is coming from and where it's going.30 years ago, did anyone imagine that Dubai would be such a great transhipment hub? It became because of the pattern of trade flows. In the same way, 20 years ago, did someone imagine that Colombo would be such a major transhipment hub? How many people were doubting Thomas about Waddingham? They felt it was so close to Colombo that it would never be an effective transhipment hub. Yet, I find the same people arguing today that, hence, you don't need to have great Nicobar and Galatia away. And today, right now, in this Gulf crisis over the last six weeks, Waddingham has become the major transhipment hub between the East and the West. So, when you look at the longer term, you look at the Bay of Bengal, you look at the natural resources of the Bay of Bengal, you look 20-30 years down the line. And you ask yourself, what is the trade flow in this region? Obviously, India's central position in the Indian Ocean region, the way it is, the way the geography is, you'll have trade flowing across the Bay of Bengal into and out of the Indian coast and ports. Which is a viable hub that can be created, which prevents movement across the Bay of Bengal? Tomorrow, today you may have doubts as to how much Myanmar exports, how much Thailand exports, or how much Malaysia exports and in which direction they are going, south or east. But look further ahead at the basic macros of this region, whether it's the Indian East Coast, it's Bangladesh, it's Myanmar, it's Thailand. You look at the entire concept of BIMSTEC, in which direction will the multimodal transit move? Now your hub for the entire Bay of Bengal, for it to reach out into Southeast Asia. If you need to cite a hub for that, where are you going to create that? Just look at the map. It's right there. It's Galatia Bay. That's the centre point. You create that investment into that today. Don't look upon returns that are going to come to you in two or three years. It takes time to build up bases; it takes time to build a commercial base, a naval base. Life is the same as a human being. It takes 30 to 40 years for it to mature. Look further down the line, we should have commenced this project 20 years ago, in my personal view. Now that you're commencing it, look at 20 to 30 years down the line, how this situation is going to shape up.

Sandeep Unnithan: This has been in the pipeline for a very long time.

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): There have been discussions about it for at least 25 years, probably much more than that. And now that it's on the cusp of making it, to start raising doubts about it, I'm a little surprised at that. To my mind, it's a great strategic value. Because, as you said, geoeconomic, I'll just say geostrategic, because that geography, that strategy, it will cover economics, it will cover politics, it will even cover military. Remember, this is a near choke point. It's at the mouth of the Malacca. It's also the mouth of the Bay of Bengal on the eastern side, the entire Andaman Sea and that entire ring that is across over there. I think it's a fantastic idea whose time is long overdue, and we need to push it as fast as possible.

Sandeep Unnithan: Absolutely. And as you said, it's not just going to meet our requirements, but it's for the entire Bay of Bengal Rim countries.

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): And we're speaking of the Bay of Bengal Rim, we've been talking of multi-sectoral trade and economic corridors. We've been talking of BIMSTEC, we've been talking of interlinking all these countries and building up an economy the way it used to be once upon a time, 1000 years ago. Well, you look into 30 to 40 years from now, and as the region is developing, remember, the basic mantra of Sagar doesn't go away, as well as the follow-on of Mahasagar. Mutual and holistic advancement of security and growth for all in the region. Now you look at the Bay of Bengal Rim, and you look at the Bay of Bengal as a whole, and you look at the Bay of Bengal and Andamans vis-a-vis Southeast Asia. Now, if you take the overall potential of the people, the resources of this entire region of the Bay of Bengal and ASEAN and Southeast Asia, which geographically is one point which can act as a hub reaching out to all of them. And you have it right there. Galatia Bay.

Sandeep Unnithan: You have it. So, it's India's foot in the ASEAN door as well.

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): We've been talking of look East, then act East. Now you're actually acting East. Now then, you're actually acting East as well as acting BIMSTEC as well as the Bay of Bengal. This is not the time to start developing new doubts. We've been through this before. Move on with it. More power to the people who are doing it, I say.  Do it yesterday already.

Sandeep Unnithan: Do it yesterday already. Indeed, Admiral Singh. Now, you know, coming to China's naval ambitions for the Indo-Pacific, China's already got the largest navy in the world in terms of numbers and not tonnage. But where does this leave us, the Indian Navy, as you know, as an adversarial country, we've got an unsettled land boundary with them. How is this conflict? How is this competition going to play out in the maritime domain?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): Look, at a policy level, you always try to try and reach a rapprochement with China. Yet the tensions that are underlying and the conflict that we've had, and there have always been twists and turns, is a matter of historical record. The Chinese intransigence at times, blow hot, blow cold, indicates that at best, you can keep trying and must continuously keep trying to manage your relationships. And I think at the diplomatic level, they're doing a fine job with that. But for the military man, you're never optimistic. As a military man, you always have to look at it, except for the Pakistanis, who are always overoptimistic, and they always kind of overestimate their skills. But as a military person, you also have to be realistic. And if anything, be cautious and look at things a little pessimistically, because you have to be prepared for the West. Everyone else can hope and plan for the best. You have to prepare for the West. So, the kind of potential that the Chinese military has built up is mind-boggling. The pace at which their growth is taking place right now. It is more than what happened in Germany in the 30s, or by the Soviet Union after the Second World War and during the Second World War. Imperial Japan was already well developed. I'm talking about the pace of growth. So they are building 10 to 12 modern frigates and destroyers a year. And each of these is an absolutely advanced technology. Today, they got the third aircraft carrier ready. Certainly, there's no doubt that they have strong interests and stakes all across the world, including in the Indian Ocean. They've been pressing and pushing for the BRI for more than a decade. They've been investing in countries and ports in the region. The Navy has been operating consistently since 2008. At any given time, they will have between three to five military ships in the region because one task force, when it goes off, doesn't return immediately. It then goes and establishes present exercises, moves around, establishing their interest and intent in the region. So, you can accept and accept that there is going to be a long-term, larger presence of the Chinese Navy here.  Is it by itself threatening? By itself? No, they have an interest just as we keep operating in the Indo-Pacific region. Can intent change while capabilities take time? That is what, as a military person, you have to look at. Currently, their growth is largely focused on securing their interest in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. The next step is going to be to push and maintain dominance up to the second island chain. By the time they do that, that's the stage at which I expect them to have a much stronger permanent presence in the Indian Ocean. Could that translate into a military threat? At some point, it has to be catered for. Currently, geography, the current stage, doesn't favour them because they don't have fixed bases. They just got one Djibouti base, which is inside the Gulf of Aden. And whatever collusion they may be able to do on the Makran coast with the Pakistanis. But they don't have military long legs in the region currently. But do they have ships that have long endurance? Absolutely. They got a huge amount of merchant shipping. I mean, they're building the ship building of China alone which touches 50% of the world's ship building. And 50% of the world's shipbuilding is Chinese. And between South Korea and Japan, between them, they take up another 40%. And 10% of the rest of the world is 0.9%. So that's the kind of massive industrial base they are pumping out over there. So certainly, it's simply a question of time before the dominance they're able to carry all across the region is going to be that high. I certainly expect to see if the current trajectory doesn't alter for strategic reasons or opposition. Within the next decade, you mentioned that the largest in number but not in combat power. But within the next decade, that is set to change. At a certain inflexion point, one hopes that the relations continue the way they are currently, that they're stable. But should they not, and things get testy or worse, what is the amount of combat power they will be able to bring to the maritime front? In what period of time? These are issues that the professional forces and the personnel are all studying and examining. I would say that, courtesy of geography and the factors that I just narrated, it would not be considered a major threat factor at the current moment. But it could change in the next decade.

Sandeep Unnithan: When you say a presence, a permanent presence in the IOR, are you talking of a carrier battle group, for instance, what kind of assets would they deploy?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): Well, I would certainly expect that since they don't have any permanent bases other than Djibouti as of now. And there doesn't appear to be anything that can get converted beyond dual use, which is mostly investment in the civil sector. So it's okay for peacetime. They would certainly need to have a carrier battle group present somewhere with a long logistic trail. At what stage would that CBG come in and start operating here? The earliest would be when three carrier battle groups are fully operational and standalone. And the third is happening just now. So certainly, it would be logical to expect a Chinese CBG operating in the IOR, I'd say by the end of next year, or maximum the year after that. Thereafter, I would expect that the current trajectory doesn't change. I'm just looking at the current trajectory that would become from initial periodic deployments would become more frequent till they can develop at least a second base, like Djibouti, and can start stationing vessels here. Of course, a lot of this is a long trajectory, Sandeep, because many things may change because economic interests may change, economic areas with which they're trading may change, and strategic parameters may change. I'm only answering this question as a hypothetical to say, you look at the current situation, you take the trend across. And I think within the next two to four years, you can expect to see a carrier battle group starting to operate in the IOR.

Sandeep Unnithan: Is it going to cause us serious costs or concern? Is it something that will keep naval planners up at night?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): By itself, if your relations are good, certainly not. Relations can change fast. So, should we be planning for it, catering for it, building up the what-if scenarios? Well, that's the bread and butter of any professional military officer. Their job is to keep looking at what-if and what-then and what-now and what-next.

Sandeep Unnithan: What next? What next, indeed. But speaking of what-next, I can't imagine another time, at least in the 21st century, Admiral Singh, when maritime matters were suddenly so front and centre. I mean, you're looking at the campaign that the Houthis fought at the choke point at the Bab-el-Mandeb, which you just spoke of. The Strait of Hormuz is active. You're looking at a brown water navy versus a blue water navy. You have, of course, India and Pakistan, what we did during Op Sindhur, compellence. Is this a time where great power rivalry is playing out in the maritime dimension? And therefore, it is a one in a century moment that we're living through right now?

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): No, I wouldn't actually go as far as that because, you know, what we're seeing is almost all of it has happened before. It's just the technology and the actors have changed. There's nothing new about navies at choke points being able to exercise disproportionate leverage on extra-regional forces. I mean, what is different about a choke point like Hormuz vis-à-vis Khyber Pass? It's the same. You're operating in a pass or Nathula or, you know, any of the other passes. Whoever's got control over a pass can exercise disproportionate military leverage on the force that is trying to come out from a different region. Same as at sea. So, all through history, you've been seeing this, whether it's in the Aegean Sea or you've been seeing in the Dardanelles or, you know, across the Mediterranean or Hormuz as you're seeing just now. So, there is nothing that has suddenly become different. It's just that you look historically, similar patterns of choke points, venturi effect, control of movement of forces and how much of an impingement that a smaller force can have on a larger force at that area. If you look at Guerrilla warfare or Shivaji's time versus the Mughals. So, what is once in a century different about it? The actors have changed, the technology has changed, but it's pretty much the same. Even when you talk of a brown water force, if the area under contestation is close to land points, which have geographical advantages of overlooking the strait vis-a-vis say a flat area, which can be seen from far away, is the same as a valley pass, where somebody's operating from the hills and is able to look down into the narrow choke point that the other force has to transit through. So even the actions that we are talking about, attacks from land to sea, you've seen them in 2014. In 2014 itself, you had through the Suez, you had rocket attacks taking place on merchant vessels. You've had attacks taking place in 2019 by unnamed actors, which could have been attributed to the Houthis, or could have been some other irregularities of Fujairah in the Gulf of Oman. You've had piracy attacks historically, always taking place. And most of those are always taking place in choke points, like what used to happen in the Malacca, and then happened in the Gulf of Aden. So, there is nothing drastically different. It is just recognising that these are factors of geography, especially economic, because economics means the flow becomes more. Translate to military, once there's an economy involved, then somebody needs to protect it, and somebody wants to interdict it. So, you have geography, you have economy, you have military, and you have trade in between. And the rest is a question of, as I said, take a piece of paper, look at all your permutations and combinations, ask yourself a question, what, then ask yourself questions, what if, and ask yourself a third question, then what?

Sandeep Unnithan: Then what, indeed. But that's a nice way of putting it, Admiral Singh, you know, the fact that the fact that while we think that we're living in very unique times this has always been the case as you said but it's good to have wakeup calls like this once in a while when we suddenly get aware about the fact that why we need navies why you need secure lanes of seal lanes of communication why we need a merchant shipping fleet for instance

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd):  I don't think that this is on the consciousness. Perhaps in India, we may have got uh over a period of time too focused as we keep saying sea blindness but that is not historically the case. Historically, whether it was the Cholas or it was the Malabar kingdom in those days, you always had very robust trade all across the east and west. You always had a very strong merchant fleet, and that is what led to your prosperity. You go back to Roman times.  Yes. I mean that we still discover and rediscover the traces that happened between India and Rome from that period onwards. So, there is nothing. Perhaps we turned away from the seas, and now we are turning back to the seas, and in turning back to the seas, one of the key factors has been prosperity, because your prosperity finally comes from trade. The most effective trade is the one that is across waters, whether you take inland waterways or you take trade across the seas. I mean, that is how your prosperity grew, whether the Chola kingdom or the Malabar kingdoms, so likewise in the northern areas, you did not have it all across in east and west, you always had a very strong merchant fleet, and that is what led to your prosperity. You go back to Roman times. Yes. I mean that we still discover and rediscover the traces that happened between India and Rome from that period onwards. So, there is nothing. Perhaps we turned away from the seas, and now we are turning back to the seas, and in turning back to the seas, one of the key factors has been prosperity, because your prosperity finally comes from trade. The most effective trade is the one that is across waters, whether you take inland waterways or you take trade across the seas. I mean that is how your prosperity grew, whether in the Chola kingdom or the Malabar kingdoms so likewise in the northern areas, you did not have the trade was far less. We tend to remember the Silk Road, and we tend to remember the desert caravans across, but the amount of goods that could be traded there was a microcosm of what trade could always be carried out at sea. Now if you look at exactly now you now if you look at what was your trade 40 years ago 40 years ago 40% of India's trade was being carried on Indian flag vessels 40 years ago 70% of India's oil needs were met from domestic consumption today you have 4 1/2% of India's trade is carried on Indian flag vessels it's just 4 and 12%  4 and 1/2% now this is even though your merchant shipping has been growing. Your annual growth rate has been almost 3% over the last at least at least 20 years if I stretch it back maybe all the way up to 40 years which is slightly better than the global average but your trade and your national prosperity has grown much more than that oil you were able to meet 70% of your oil needs domestically 70 years ago today barely touching 10% about 90 to 90.5% of your total oil is being imported and because you have excess refining capacity and getting back to that you know you somebody planned ahead and invested in excess capacity and the time came say you are a major exporter today 25% of what you're importing is getting reexported including uh oil that I'm talking about the petroleum products petroleum products refined products 25% of the oil that you're importing you're reexporting if you're importing about 242 million metric tons you're exporting about 65 million metric tons of petroleum products thereafter >> and out of your domestic consumption of what is about 9 and a half% about half of that is from your offshore oil rigs. Now, if I were to just put that together, it's again about the same magical figure of 96 and a half% is your dependence on the seas just for your oil. Now your oil, your trade, your gas, um, what we talk of blue economy, the amount of dependence that you have on the seas, your men today, India has about 16th of the world sea farers are Indian but 85% of your seafarers are on foreign flag vessels,  one third of the crew operating at any given time in the Indian Ocean region are Indian citizens. So, you have about 120,000 ships that traverse through the Indian Ocean region annually. Take that total crew on board. One third of them are Indian. Now, 85% of the trade from here is extra-regional.  It's moving everywhere. So, your stakes as a country in the seas around you are that high for your national growth and prosperity. That is why I mentioned some time back, the vision of Sagar was a brilliant, eternal vision because your national growth and prosperity are absolutely anchored to the seas. And that's why a couple of years ago, the defence minister made a very apt statement. He said India is an island nation with land borders.

Sandeep Unnithan: India is an island nation with land borders indeed. And thank you so much, Admiral Singh, for waking us up to that reality and forcing us to take our sea blind spectacles off and look once again at the sea, because as I've also maintained, there is no growth for India without realising its maritime potential, and who better than you to talk about this. Thank you very much for your time and for your thoughts.

Vice Admiral Sanjay Jasjit Singh (Retd): Thank you, Sandeep. Thanks a lot.

Watch the full podcast: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TunJz3baXzA&t=1s

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