What will Asim Munir do next?
Sandeep Unnithan, Editor in Chief, Chakra News, in conversation with Lt General P R Shankar, Professor, IIT Madras & Distinguished Fellow, CLAWS.
Gen P R Shankar: Good morning and welcome to the weekend edition of Ghana Short and Chapter News. I'm back this Sunday after a long hiatus with Sandeep Unnithan. Sandeep, welcome back, we've missed, we're meeting now after two weeks.
Sandeep Unnithan: We're meeting after two weeks, that's correct, General Shankar. I've taken a short break, I've gone to Kerala for less than a week, I mean pre-ONAM, after a very long time.
Gen P R Shankar: Pre-ONAM, yeah.
Sandeep Unnithan: Yes, had an interesting trip full of history and of course meeting family. Yeah, so, great. General Shankar, it's almost, you know, a Groundhog Day moment.
We're back to talking about Asim Munir. You know, he's an interesting character, he's always in the news and he's always doing something. And there's elements of all the four Pakistani dictators mixed in it.
You know, I was on Gaurav Sawant's show recently on India Today and he was talking about, he asked me, will the Triple One Brigade once again be activated and stuff like that. I said the Triple One Brigade has nothing to do now, it's been idle for so long and probably will not have to do anything. Because of what the constitutional changes Munir has brought in, in Pakistan, 27th Amendment.
Now he's a constitutionally enshrined dictator. The Triple One Brigade has nothing to do. They will be sitting in the barracks.
Gen P R Shankar: Yeah, I completely agree with you. If you remember a long time back in one of the things I said, he's a constitutional dictator. Yes, absolutely.
Okay, he is a constitutional dictator. He's an interesting character, I have no doubt about it. A very interesting character.
You know, for more than India, I think he's a very interesting character for Pakistan itself. Right. And anyway, we'll discuss him because I think he's consequential in the current situation.
Sandeep Unnithan: Yes.
Gen P R Shankar: The way he's going about doing things. So I'll set the ball rolling, we'll take it on from there.
Sandeep Unnithan: So General Shankar, I want to start by asking you this question, it's a controversial one. General Anil Chauhan just last week spoke about that loitering munitions strike at Kirana Hills. He said it was an accident.
And of course, you know, I was going back and looking at all the statements that came out after Apsindoor on the 10th of May last year, the morning of 10th of May, when we carried out this unprecedented set of strikes and we had a briefing after that. I think it was on the 11th of May where the DGMOs of the three Army, Navy and Air Force came forward and they gave a detailed breakdown of all the strikes. But the one strike that was never described unaccounted for was that blast outside the Kirana Hills, which now General Anil Chauhan says was an accidental thing of, you know, a loitering munition.
And I have a smile on my face when I say a loitering munition because I don't think that was a loitering munition given the sound.
Gen P R Shankar: I agree with you.
Sandeep Unnithan: Yeah. Yeah. And, you know, that roar of a supersonic engine followed by that thunderous crash and explosion of about 290 kilos of high explosive doesn't seem to be a loitering munition.
I think it is a very precise strike. And as people are saying, it was a knock on Pakistan's nuclear door. Do you go with that theory that this was actually a warning to Pakistan to say that just six hours before that, that's the most important thing.
Just six hours before, around 1.30 in the night, they launched a ballistic missile towards New Delhi. It was intercepted near Sirsa. It was a FATA-2 ballistic missile.
Of course, we have issued no statements officially about it. But there's been a considerable dismay about what Pakistan did. And a lot of experts believe that what happened six hours later, around 9.30, 10, that blast at Kirana was a warning. Do you believe in that theory or it's speculation?
Gen P R Shankar: Okay, let's reconstruct the events. Midnight, you intercept incoming ballistic missile. Yeah.
And if you remember, you had said this is the only first time a ballistic missile has been fired by a nuclear nation against another nuclear nation. And it was intercepted. There was no doubt about it.
You know, we've only known one ballistic missile which has been intercepted. We don't know where the others went because they did fire 3-4. They fired 3-4?
Yeah, yeah, yeah. They showed the pictures. Right.
They showed the pictures of that. So they were dodged, we don't know where they fell, they must have. But be that as it may, they did fire ballistic missiles.
So what did you do? You actually hit his main runways at Sargodha, Noorkhan and all where he's got nuclear capability. And your hits were so precise that you, you know, put that runway out of operation.
Right. That was on 10th morning. Okay.
Yeah. But the most significant thing happened to set stage for this on 8th. Right.
When your Harpeys went and Harrops, went and took out their air defence networks. Right.
Sandeep Unnithan: The radars, I think.
Gen P R Shankar: Radars.
Sandeep Unnithan: I know there were 6 of their air defence radars, 2 were destroyed.
Gen P R Shankar: 2 were destroyed and we don't know how much of their communications was destroyed. Why I am saying communication means, you see, a nation's capability to defend itself or go on the offensive is largely dictated on the communications. Okay.
Communications are the lifeblood of operations and your air defence tells you how you can defend yourself. The air defence command and control system went off with those radars. So thereafter your radar systems were actually blind.
And if your radar systems are blind, you don't have air defence, as simple as that. That happened. That happened on 8th.
We also, in that, it is very fair to assume that, you know, a lot of your, when your command and control systems go, a lot of your communications also go with it. So by 10th morning, 10th midnight, the Pakis were quite handicapped. Right.
Sandeep Unnithan: They were blind, would you say they were blind?
Gen P R Shankar: I wouldn't say they were blind, but they were handicapped. Let's put it this way. I am giving the best to them and the worst to us.
They were, 10th morning, you know, these chaps said that Fajar ke time pe I want to pray. I don't know, Fajar is daybreak or something.
Sandeep Unnithan: Yeah, Fajar is the prayers at daybreak.
Gen P R Shankar: Daybreak, earliest. Right.
Sandeep Unnithan: Yeah.
Gen P R Shankar: So they wanted to start some operations at daybreak, but midnight you went and hit them. Yeah. And where did you hit them?
You hit them at all their main airbases, Noorkhan and Sargodha and Munir, Murid and Rahim Yar Khan, all those, all those windows, three, four as you plastered them.
Sandeep Unnithan: 1000 kilometre span and 200 kilometres deep.
Gen P R Shankar: See, yeah, that is the length of it. But that to me was not important. The important thing is you hit their runways.
Right. You hit their capability to take off and land. You put the runways out of action, even if it was a red day.
Right. Now, which meant that that was out. You couldn't take off.
So your air defence system and communications and command and control systems were, have been down for the past two days. Your HQ9 systems have been hit and then your air defence has been hit or your capability to take off has been degraded, degraded. And one hour, this in the same time frame, you also know, it's now come to light that your S-400 took out AWACS, it also took out a couple of other aircraft at the longest hit and all that which we know.
So, Pakistan by 10 o'clock in the morning was absolutely in no shape to retaliate. It was on its knees. It was on its knees.
So, if it was on its knees, right, and that is admitted by almost everyone. Yeah. I think this CPHM report also says the same thing.
Yeah. Yeah. Right.
Yeah. Not this. This report also says the same thing.
Sandeep Unnithan: Yeah. So, the report basically says, the highlighted portion says that by the morning of 10th May 2025, the IAF had succeeded in achieving air superiority over a significant portion of Pakistan's airspace. This in turn enabled it to continue long-range strikes against enemy infrastructure at will, at least for as long as it retained sufficient stocks of munitions such as BrahMos or Scal PG.
At the same time, now this is important, this basically takes from what you are saying, General Shankar. At the same time, the Pakistan Air Force had lost the ability to repeat the operations it had conducted so successfully on the 7th of May 2025 owing to the loss of its forward surveillance air radars and the threat posed by S-400 systems to its AWACS and standoff weapons delivery platforms while its own strikes conducted between 7th and 10th May had been largely thwarted by Indian defences. I think this is the nub of this report.
And I am going to put a copy of this report in the description. You can read it for yourself. It's a very exhaustive, short but very exhaustive report prepared by the CHPM which is the Centre of Historic Day Prospective Militaries.
It's a neutral thing from a neutral country, a Geneva based think tank. It's done a very clinical assessment of what happened during Op Sindhur. It was released on Jan.
Like you said, the Pakistan Air Force, Pakistan was on its knees by the 10th of May in the morning.
Gen P R Shankar: Yeah. So, this is where the most important part of what came out of that story. See, when did this hit on Kirana Hills happen?
In the morning of 10th.
Sandeep Unnithan: I think it was the last, towards the end of the day.
Gen P R Shankar: Yeah. Let's build some logic into this. Why was that strike undertaken?
You see, by then Pakistan was probably against the wall. Right. It was against the wall.
It didn't have much left. And so, at that point of time when all red lines had been crossed by India, it might have entertained thoughts of using a nuclear weapon. Right.
But though I believe by then their game was up. Yes. And I had said this earlier if you remember.
Yeah. You know, Kirana Hills, everyone knows, stocks their nuclear weapons. Right.
Sargodha is their main base from which they can launch. Right. Their missiles had been intercepted.
So, even if you put a, you know, by then they would have known that even if I fire a missile in the morning, it will get intercepted. Right. And the chances of success are low.
Right. So, there were no and one. Number two is even if you want to, see, air launched nuclear weapons were out of equation because they couldn't take off from there.
Their runways are all paralyzed. Are all paralyzed.
Sandeep Unnithan: Yes.
Gen P R Shankar: So, the only thing was a ground-launched nuclear weapon in the morning.
Sandeep Unnithan: Yeah. Yeah.
Gen P R Shankar: Yeah. Now, whatever. Now, that ground-launched weapon also has to, also needs a air defense cover.
Yes. Look, I have commanded a artillery division. I know it.
When I planned my moves, I needed air cover. Without air cover, I wouldn't move.
Sandeep Unnithan: So, this is a very important point. Like, you know, most of us, we always see TELs on parades. TEL is the Transport Director Launcher which carries a single weapon, a ballistic missile, IRBM.
Why does it need air cover?
Gen P R Shankar: Look, you need air cover for this entire system in two, three places. One is where it is hiding. Right.
If this, you know, if your vector gets, you know, detected and it is attacked in your hide. After all, it has to be somewhere. It cannot be in a shed, you know.
Yeah. Yeah. It has to be in a hide.
So, that hide needs cover. Then, it has to move from place A to place B. That movement needs cover.
Then, it has to go and deploy and prepare and then launch. It needs cover. So, it has got dedicated air defense cover.
And, this dedicated air defense cover is not two, single tire. It is two tire. It is always two tire.
So, one is the integral air defense cover which these vectors will have. Will have. Right.
I had it. I am telling you that.
Sandeep Unnithan: What did you, without revealing too many details, I mean.
Gen P R Shankar: We had it. Is it man pads? Man pads.
Dedicated air defense.
Sandeep Unnithan: AD. Right.
Gen P R Shankar: I will have, what it is, you know, depends on what kind of a system which is available in a particular formation, you get that. And based on the threat and all that. Right.
And then, the second layer of air defense is the air base around. The air base gives you the air defense because the air base itself has some air defense plus the air defense aircraft also give you that cover. Right.
And, you get close in cover. So, it is layered. You move these weapons under layered conditions.
Layered air defense conditions. Right. Those layers were broken.
You see, it is nice to have a weapon, but I need to know where the threat is coming from. And, air threat for a point defense is all around. Yeah.
It can come at 360. Right. So, if I have to have that, I need that, you know, I need the, I need a surveillance system, I need a command and control system and everything, which had completely gone down in Pakistan and they could not have deployed anything.
Now, this is the thing. So, the desperation of Pakistan could have been, I take a weapon out, a nuclear vector out, if I want to nuclearize the whole story and go up the escalation ladder, wherever it is, I take one vector out, mount a nuclear warhead on it and fire. Right.
Pakistan had that option. Take that risk with one, just one. Right.
You do not need hundred. To prove your point, you need one. Right.
Okay. Because, that would be the third nuclear weapon fired in anger after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Right.
They could have done that. But, to obviate that, you hit them at Kirana. Okay.
You hit them. Everyone knows that Kirana has got something. So, you hit them at Kirana and that would have told Pakistan, look, so, it is better to call it a day.
Right. My view is that Kirana strike convinced the Pakistanis that they could, they had to come down and put the white flag up. Right.
But, it is, let us be very clear, I mean, I have no doubt about it, it is the Kirana strike which made them put the white flag up. And, they need, they decided that they will live to fight another day. Right.
But, the interesting thing is, why did, why did Anjul Anil Chauhan say it was a, you know, drone or something like that. So, that is to be seen. We will come out, we will come to know about why this.
Sandeep Unnithan: What is your educated guess on this? Why did he say? Do you think it was some kind of confidence building measure or something like that?
Gen P R Shankar: Maybe, it is a bit of a, little bit of a olive branch to them to say, okay, better come and behave, otherwise, you know, and it is also telling them, look, we know what we have done. Right. We know what we have done, we could have done more.
Right. We only know not making it public. Right.
Right. So, I, and that is about it.
Sandeep Unnithan: No, so, it is a, what you just, the picture that you have painted is a terrifying picture for any military that you are so helpless, you are a nuclear armed country, you can't move your nuclear vectors, your air force can't take off. You know, it is an all round picture of all round helplessness.
Gen P R Shankar: Yes, there is no doubt. There is no doubt about it. They were in a, and that is why they came at 10.30 or so and spoke to our DGMO and said, let us call it off. Right. So, enough is enough, please let me, leave me alone and this thing. Yeah.
The rest of the, you know, their loudspeaker effect is different. Leave that. Narrative warfare.
Narrative, that is a narrative.
Sandeep Unnithan: But the real narrative, the ground narrative, everyone knows. Everyone knows now. Everyone knows.
Knock on the door.
Gen P R Shankar: Knock, knock, I am here.
Sandeep Unnithan: Knock, knock, I am here.
Gen P R Shankar: I am here.
Sandeep Unnithan: And you know, a very interesting report that has gone unnoticed, General Shankar, I was just googling this, you know, on the 10th of May, Reuters, now Reuters is very pro-Pakistan, especially the Islamabad chapter.
Gen P R Shankar: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Correspondent, yeah.
Sandeep Unnithan: They came out with this line saying, see, Pakistan Prime Minister calls meeting of body that oversees nuclear arsenal, says Pakistan military. Now there is this report. You remember that?
On the morning of May 10th. And then a few hours later, that meeting is abruptly cancelled.
Gen P R Shankar: Cancelled.
Sandeep Unnithan: Why? There is no such meeting. So exactly.
Gen P R Shankar: Why?
Sandeep Unnithan: Is it because they got the memo?
Gen P R Shankar: They didn't have the command and communication. They didn't have the ADC and R. Right.
By then you had hit, their air defence was down. By then they couldn't take off. By then your S-400 had hit their AWACS.
Right. And see, okay, look at it, deconstruct, let's deconstruct it from their side. You wanted to undertake a mission at, after the first prayer in the morning.
Right. Okay. Before they could take that, undertake that, you went and hit them.
So logically, you should have, your plan was to anyway hit India.
Sandeep Unnithan: Yeah. Okay.
Gen P R Shankar: And you did fire a missile, midnight, got intercepted. They would have also known it got intercepted. Okay.
Now they would have said, okay, this is the way I am going to redo my strike and all and I am ready for a strike in the morning first thing. Right. One hour before that strike happens, you see Brahmo's missile hitting.
Yeah. That is what even, not only us, not only Shahbaz Sharif, even that fellow Ishaq there, he has also said, hum bhi tayyaar the, par unne ne pehle hi Brahmo's ka harkat shuru kar diya. Nahi, he has admitted it.
Sandeep Unnithan: He said this. In the National Assembly, I think he said it.
Gen P R Shankar: No, no, no, he said this in public, in an interview with Hameed Mir.
Sandeep Unnithan: Okay, right.
Gen P R Shankar: Okay, he said, isse pehle unne ne Brahmo's ka harkat kar diya. See, it's a tacit admission ki bhai, we wanted to do it at 5 o'clock or I mean 5, 4, whatever. Yeah.
But they hit us. The moment they hit us, we couldn't do anything more. Right.
Done. They couldn't do anything more.
Sandeep Unnithan: Khel khatam.
Gen P R Shankar: Khel khatam. By then the khel was khatam and then you went and hit them at Kirana and end of story. See, if I were in Pakistan's place, I have been hit, I am ready, whole night I have been ready.
On the go, I want to go and hit India first thing in the morning and shot them out. Right. But yet, you can't, you didn't, you didn't.
The important thing is they didn't. This was their plan which their Prime Minister and their Deputy Prime Minister have gone on record publicly and said we wanted to hit them after that Fajr prayers. Shabash Sharif himself has said that.
Sandeep Unnithan: Yeah.
Gen P R Shankar: In some parliament or somewhere he said. Okay. And he couldn't, they didn't.
Why didn't they do? Let me ask this counter question. Why didn't Pakistan go ahead with their plans?
Very clearly from what you are saying, you have disrupted, you have disrupted their entire C4ISR. They didn't have the capability to carry out their plans. Yes. What you said, it is not disrupted, you have decimated.
Sandeep Unnithan: Right.
Gen P R Shankar: Right. And then so at that point of time, the only thing is I will do my nuclear command and control and all that.
Sandeep Unnithan: Right. That's why. I will carry out the meeting and yeah.
Gen P R Shankar: I will carry out the meeting. Then suddenly someone would have told him partner don't do it, that fellow has already hit you in Kirana hills.
Sandeep Unnithan: Yeah. Oh so the Kirana hill strike was there and very significantly all these strikes that we have done were I think around in the midnight. One, two o'clock around that time.
Gen P R Shankar: And the Kirana was in the morning.
Sandeep Unnithan: Broad daylight. It was the last.
Gen P R Shankar: Broad daylight.
Sandeep Unnithan: Last this thing. And it was very visible. You had that blast.
Gen P R Shankar: See, in this, the thing about Kirana hill, why did it come in the morning, it came, I mean why did it come in the morning is very simple. The public of Pakistan knew Kirana hill was hit.
Sandeep Unnithan: Right. Oh so it was a symbolic messaging to the people of Pakistan, not just.
Gen P R Shankar: Not just the Prime Minister.
Sandeep Unnithan: Military or the political.
Gen P R Shankar: Yeah. So the point is very clear that they were hit and the public messaging and everything. See, you can always contest that my AWACS didn't you know get hit by S400 and all that.
That is fine, that they can talk. But this is something which people have seen, people going on motorcycles have taken pictures. And they all, everyone knows what is in Kirana hills.
It is the most open international secret.
Sandeep Unnithan: We have known it since the 80s I think, the late 80s.
Gen P R Shankar: 80s. Okay. We know.
So once you know that and that has been hit, then whatever comes out of that will also be hit. Okay.
Sandeep Unnithan: So this was the very last this thing, yeah.
Gen P R Shankar: And the fact is if you do an attack on Kirana hills. Yes. If you do an attack on Kirana hills, the chances of their own nuclear arsenal going up in their own area is very high.
Sandeep Unnithan: Right.
Gen P R Shankar: You don't always have to use nuclear weapon to sort that fellow out. You sort out his nuclear weapons, everything is sorted out.
Sandeep Unnithan: Right.
Gen P R Shankar: Right. So I think that is the story. Again, when I meet Anil Johan, I keep meeting him on and off.
I have been meeting him regularly. The last time I met him was when I went to talk in CDM. Right.
We had dinner together. We were just across and discussing. Right.
Right. College of Defense Management. Yes.
And I will ask him next time I meet him, why did you do say this? Why were you giving him the benefit of the doubt? If the situation demands, I will speak about it.
Otherwise, I will just keep quiet about it. Okay.
Sandeep Unnithan: Let's look at that strike again. I have a short video clip of this.
Gen P R Shankar: Yeah, if you load it, I will show it.
Sandeep Unnithan: Can I? Here it is.
Gen P R Shankar: Yeah, I can. I can. I will add it.
Yeah, I will just add it to the stage. Wait. Wait.
Wait. Wait. Yeah.
Yeah, that's not a, that's not a drone.
Sandeep Unnithan: That is definitely a 3D55 ramjet engine for all of us who have seen that BrahMos missile being tested. My God.
Gen P R Shankar: Yeah, that's not a drone.
Sandeep Unnithan: That's not a drone. It's not a launcher munition.
Gen P R Shankar: Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Sandeep Unnithan: It's a very precise munition.
Gen P R Shankar: And, you know, Jayanth is asking this question, sir, please explain what the strike package could be. What their strike package could be? Okay, let me explain to you.
Their strike package, the Pakistani strike package was very simple. Missiles, that's it. They couldn't have flown.
See, one of the things about this entire, you know, picture of Sindhur was aircraft did not cross over.
Sandeep Unnithan: That's very significant. I think what you just said.
Gen P R Shankar: Okay, air force.
Sandeep Unnithan: That hasn't come out enough. The fact that we haven't crossed the border, they haven't crossed, we haven't crossed.
Gen P R Shankar: We have not crossed. And they didn't have the capability to do standoff. See, they might have and their capability and see the entire, so I'll get back Jayanth's question should be up here, so that you understand.
See the point is, what you go back to what Pakistan is wanted. They wanted to fire their missiles, land-based missiles. That's what they showed that Fateh-1 which they fired and all.
Sandeep Unnithan: Fateh-1, yeah.
Gen P R Shankar: Fateh-1 is a rocket and Fateh-2 is a ballistic missile. Ballistic missile. So that's what they fired.
And that's what, by that time, I'm very sure they were very clear that they will not be able to use the air vector for a nuclear delivery. If at all it had to be a ground-based missile. So Jayanth, the point is that they didn't have a strike package beyond a missile, a ballistic missile because they had nothing else.
So that's it. As simple as that, I am simplifying it. And the more you look at it simplistically, the better you get a better picture.
The Pakistanis might be inventive, might be complicated, might be aggressive and all, but to deconstruct them, you have to look at it simplistically. Simplistically looking, they didn't have the communications, they didn't have the ADC and R, they had lost the capability to take aircraft off. They were getting hit in the air as in their own territory by S-400.
You mean to say they don't know that their, you know, AWACS had gone? It had gone. And a couple of more had gone, their, you know, aircraft inside the hangar, we don't even know how many have gone.
And their UAVs were hit, everything was hit. And they didn't have a capability to retaliate back, their own plan was derailed. So what strike package they could have had?
Our strike package was simple, scalp and this and that and all that, and you know BrahMos of course. And BrahMos did the trick. So I know BrahMos.
Gen P R Shankar: I know how it has worked and right, what you saw Sandeep, I must also clarify in that picture which you showed. Let me get back. You see, if you see this, there is a lot of smoke up there, is not it?
Right, right. This smoke is what? This smoke is fundamentally burnt fuel, it is a fuel, un, you know, let me see, let me see, see that yellow, that yellow flame which you saw, that yellow flame which you saw sorry, that yellow flame which you saw is fuel burning in the Brahmos.
The residual fuel, that residual fuel that, that catches fire, I mean I am telling you because I have, I have forgotten how many Brahmos I have fired and what, how many Rangers I have fired. When I say how many Rangers from 40, 40 kilometer right up to 300 kilometers, okay. So, the point is this, so it is the unburned fuel which hit, which was what you saw.
The actual damage is gone in. Right, even the high explosive, the high explosive went underground. Yeah, and just think of this missile which is going at 3.5 Mach. See another thing about the Brahmos which I must tell everyone is, it always travels at 3.5 Mach. You do not 2.8 as, as a speed, you call it 3.5, I call it 3 Mach, okay, let us say 3 Mach, okay, I will not, it always travels at 3 Mach, right to the end, yeah, okay, right to the target, it goes at 3 Mach, just think the kinetic energy of a 3 Mach projectile hitting you, it is about 600 kg, yeah, it just goes in and it is got a delayed fuse and all that, yeah, yeah, and right, and you know once we are firing this missile in track island, where is track island, in the middle of nowhere in Andaman, Nicobar, and that track island let me tell you or let me tell all of you, I have been telling this story to everyone, is about 40 meters by 40 meters and in that 40 meters by 40 meters, there is a little patch of about 10 meters by 10 meters, not 10, about 15 meters by 15 meters on one half which is sandy, right, and that is used to be your target, right, the only inhabitants in that track island is crabs, nothing else, right, so actually if you go and land up there to make the, you know, mark the target and do, put a camera and all that, crabs come and get at you, you have to put it and run away from there actually, yeah, man-eating crabs, no, the crabs attack you there, no, they come near you because they sense this moment and all your food, yeah, for them, oh, okay, right, and the big crabs, okay, they come and hoards, so now that little piece of land, right, the rest is a bit rocky, little beach was where we used to put our, make it as a target because then you can do measurements, it is open, see all that, I have seen photographs of that, I have seen photographs of that test, yeah, okay, many times I have fired so many missiles there, I must tell you, I have not recovered even one round, we have never recovered even one round from there, meaning they have all gone in, right in, they just go in, end of story, right, they do not, you do not, they just get buried so deep inside, you do not see anything, so you do not get any roasted
Sandeep Unnithan: crabs when you went back there, fried crabs, so right, so that is how it is, that is how
Gen P R Shankar: the story is, so this has gone deep and hit deep and it would have shaken them up, so the tremors were felt in GHQ Rawalpindi, by then and then white flag came out, right, because they were in a position where they can do anything and you could hit their nuclear weapons at will and that is the situation, I mean, now it does not matter what the Pakistanis say or not, do not say, this is the situation and immediately they put up the white flag, right, so that is how Pakistanis are.
Sandeep Unnithan: And now you have since May 2025, you have seen a very unprecedented set of military reforms in Pakistan, possibly their most significant military reform since ever I think, I was going to say 71, post 71, but I don't think there has been such a consolidation of power in the office of the Chief of Army Staff, where the Chief of Army Staff becomes the Chief of Defence Forces, he becomes the Field Marshal for life effectively, he has got a tenure till 2030, he has also got his man as the, he has dissolved the Joint Chief of Staff Committee, he has put his man into the Nuclear Command Authority, I want you to kind of explain what that really means, that when you have the NCA with the Strategic Forces Commander, they are equivalent of, they have just started appointing a new three star who is going to be on the NCA, what does this point to, the fact that you have a political structure which is the Nuclear Command Authority, National Command Authority, and then you have Munir who is there, he has thrown out the Chief of General, I mean he has dissolved that body, Chief of General Staff, Joint, what's it called, Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee, that has been abolished, CJSC, CJSC has been abolished, Munir is now the Chief of Defence Forces and his man now sits on the NCA, so what is this point, is it because of that scare on the 10th of May when their entire nuclear command thing was shaken, is it a result of that?
Gen P R Shankar: Okay, let's look at it logically, when they got hit the way they got hit, a few holes in their whole structure came out. The first thing is, if they didn't have, if tomorrow they don't have the communications anymore, like what happened in Apsindoor, someone had to take a decision still and he felt that by then the political, if a situation similar happened, the political authority would have gone, they would have been decapitated, I wouldn't say physically, mentally, or the pressure on the political system would be so high because you see over this period of time, Vance would have spoken to them, they would have admitted, international pressure was there, Saudis had spoken to them, a whole lot of them, even the Chinese would have spoken to them, in fact the Chinese ambassador was sitting in their command post. Really? On that morning, yeah, he was sitting in their command post, it's there in public domain.
Oh, the one in Sukkur? Okay, wherever, may be in Islamabad or Sukkur, wherever, I am not, but it has come out in social media that this fellow was sitting till about 10 o'clock in the morning in one of their command posts and seeing Hopi, they would have also been told, we are going to do this first thing in the morning, we are going to hit and you watch what's happening and… Ah, right, right, right, okay.
Their plan got, and in fact they were left to defend themselves. So, he would have seen the way they got decapitated. So, he would have said, there has to be a single point authority for handling nuclear weapons.
Right. That's the first thing, that's the first lesson they would have learnt. Okay, every nuclear capability must be under one head and that head, the way Pakistan thinks, has to be the chief of army staff.
Right. Then they would have said, no, no, you know, in the past, you have seen Pakistan army and Pakistan air force having divergent views and they came out during Op2J. The air force came out later and said, we were not even consulted on this entire…
Sandeep Unnithan: Yeah, that's right, Kargil, during the Kargil… Kargil, yeah, Kargil, okay.
Gen P R Shankar: So, they would have said, no, this can't happen. So, the air force has to be under me. I mean, this is a lesson he has learnt.
Why do you think he is doing all this? There is a logic in this. So, the air force should be under me, I should have the capability to decide what to do with the nuclear setup.
The third thing is, look, I didn't have the capacity, they didn't have the capacity to retaliate conventionally. So, they had to develop a conventional response. Hence the rocket force.
Hence the rocket force and the next realization is that I might not be, in all probability to control escalation, I will not be able to use nuclear weapons. I might have the authority, but there is no way in the international scenario today, anyone is using nuclear weapons. If I use nuclear weapons, I am not talking whether he will use and will retaliate, that's a later day story.
The chance choice of using nuclear weapons was receding. Right. In his thought process, it was receding for two things.
One is the fact that there is no command authority and all that. The second is he might not be able to use the way it is. If he is not able to use nuclear weapons, that nuclear weapon holding it is of no use, it's only power, political power.
Right. So, he, right, and he had to derive political power out of nuclear weapons. Right.
And the derivation of political power out of the nuclear weapons comes from having control over it. And that's how he becomes a constitutional dictator. Please understand, this is not to fight India, this is to remain in power in Pakistan.
Sandeep Unnithan: That's a very important point.
Gen P R Shankar: Yeah, I have given you a new dimension to why he has concentrated his powers. I mean, we think that it's all against India. It's not against India, he is trying to concentrate his powers.
Sandeep Unnithan: And survive. And survive.
Gen P R Shankar: Yeah. So, if he has to hold on to those powers and survive next war with India, he needs a non-conventional force or a, not non-conventional force, a rocket force.
Sandeep Unnithan: A rocket force, yeah.
Gen P R Shankar: So, he has created that rocket force. Now that rocket force, how it is to be used with the air force, not used with the air force and all, so it has to be under one command. That's what I keep saying, you know, even for us.
The theatre command has, one of the major things about theatre command is to synergize the application of long range vectors and air or the aircraft.
Sandeep Unnithan: Air and ground and long range vectors.
Gen P R Shankar: So, they have done it. He has a necessity, even we have a necessity, we are foolishly not doing, going into the theatres. It's just not, I mean, that's a different story.
Why the air force is not doing it is a different story. Right. In our case, but he felt that, look, if I don't have this control over the air force and the rocket force, they will be in two different directions.
So, I have to be the chief of defence staff and see the, we are looking at, oh, this chap has accumulated power. Right. That's a, that's a different thing.
I will talk of it separately. But this accumulation of power comes from the fact that operationally he has to be in control. Right.
Okay. And that's it. He needs political power.
He needs operational power. So, why not do all this.
Sandeep Unnithan: I hope you are getting it. Absolutely. And I was going to go to the next aspect of this, which is that, you know, the nuclear aspect, staying on this nuclear aspect, which is the nine nuclear weapon states, you know, at least three of them, or four of them, including us, that's the US, Russia, China and India, they have got geographical depth.
They can hide their weapons wherever. Yeah. The others, which are the UK, France, Israel, even North Korea, they have got submarines in which to keep their nuclear weapons and they go out on long patrols and therefore they are, you know, safe.
They have a triad. They have a triad.
Gen P R Shankar: Exactly. North Korea is going towards a triad. They don't have…
Sandeep Unnithan: North Korea. They are launching their first nuclear submarine. They have a conventional submarine with weapons.
It's a crude one, but it's basically effective. Yeah. They have it.
It's a force in being. You will have to factor in. Pakistan claims to have a sea-based nuclear deterrent since 2017.
But the significant thing is that no deterrent patrols have been engaged in. They have not operationalised that deterrent. And there is a very interesting report that came out, I think earlier this year, from a US drop site news where they said that Pakistan was pressurising China for a nuclear submarine.
As in, they wanted the triad. Pakistan is the only country without a triad. They don't have nuclear submarines as of now.
The only of the nine nuclear weapon states. Do you believe that they are going to use this Kirana Hills NOK as a pretext to get a nuclear submarine out of the Chinese? They already tried doing that with, you know, exchanging Gwadar for a nuclear submarine.
Gen P R Shankar: No, I don't think they will give it. I don't think… See, okay, let's look at it politically first and draw me back to this topic if I veer off.
Right, sure. Now, politically, you have to understand that this guy has veered off from China.
Sandeep Unnithan: Right. He's gone to the US camp once again.
Gen P R Shankar: He's gone into the US camp without any doubt. And, you know, this goes back to the time when his Bajwa, during a lit fest or something in Karachi…
Sandeep Unnithan: Karachi lit fest. Yeah, I remember that. Yeah.
Gen P R Shankar: He said that, look, I want weapons from the West. If I don't get weapons from the West, I have to go to the Chinese. And so that's why we go to the Chinese.
Their first option is to go West. West. Their first option is to go to the USA.
Okay. So, and they found that, this chap has found that during operations, the Chinese weapons didn't function.
Sandeep Unnithan: Yeah, HQ9s got hold, you know.
Gen P R Shankar: And, let me now connect it with something contemporary. After what has happened in this Nepal flood and the Chinese reaction to it… Right.
I think their surveillance systems failed. Completely.
Sandeep Unnithan: They failed to warn the Nepalese and look at the anger that is there inside Nepal. Yeah, why is this important?
Gen P R Shankar: Now, let me connect. That's why I said I'm going to go all around but get me back to the original point. Why is it important?
It is important because in China, it's all information support service, space service. Right. There is a deep connect between the surveillance system, civil surveillance system and military surveillance system.
There is no difference, it's seamless and that's not functioned then. It didn't function during Op Sindhu. Please understand what I'm talking.
My analysis is not only, you know, it's one thing to say China has got all this. It has not functioned operationally in two conditions.
Sandeep Unnithan: Condition of war and condition of disaster.
Gen P R Shankar: Disaster and war are no different. I don't… Actually, yeah.
I have always maintained that your capabilities for disaster management and your capabilities for war are one and the same.
Sandeep Unnithan: Period. That's a very interesting way of looking at it. Never thought of it.
But yeah, please go ahead.
Gen P R Shankar: So, now after this, Ashwin Munir will say I will never go near the Chinese. I will never go near them and you know, I will go further into the east. I need something more.
To the west, you mean. Yeah, west. The west is not going to give him anything.
Neither are the Chinese going to give him anything. Please understand this. Right.
I mean, when I say not give him anything, they will give him whatever is contracted and all that. But the Chinese definitely will not give him a nuclear sub. They wouldn't have given him before and they wouldn't give him now.
Sandeep Unnithan: They won't give him after.
Gen P R Shankar: Yeah, because the cost of China giving him a nuclear sub are very high for the Chinese.
Sandeep Unnithan: You mean the political cost, the optics of…
Gen P R Shankar: Political cost. You think USA will keep quiet after that? USA will be tough to allow Pakistan to have a nuclear submarine.
Sandeep Unnithan: Yeah, because they could go and target US facilities. Yeah.
Gen P R Shankar: Yes. Where is the doubt? You think USA doesn't know Pakistan's shenanigans?
Why do you think Sergio Gore went and said Kashmir is an important part of India? It is telling Pakistan, just be where you are. And if they say, you know, POJK is part of India, that whole story there is finished.
Please see, we have to be very clear what game USA is playing. Right. USA, at the end of the day, why are they fighting Iran?
Why are they fighting Iran? They were fighting Iran for the simple reason that they need protection, homeland protection. They do not do anything with Iran.
It's homeland protection so that tomorrow a missile doesn't fly towards USA. Or a backpack bomb doesn't go from Iran to USA. Right.
They have gone through September 11, 9-11, they have gone through.
Sandeep Unnithan: It's going to be 25 years of 9-11 next month.
Gen P R Shankar: Yeah, and where did it originate from? Pakistan. Pakistan.
No one has doubts about it in USA. And I don't know if you remember the day when it went. I still remember I was in Jammu that day.
Part of the high command, we were all sitting, we were all young colonels, upcoming colonels and we were discussing the pros, cons and everything. And all of us knew this was coming from Pakistan. So, you think USA will allow Pakistan to ever have a nuclear submarine from China?
Then it's war. Then it's war. Absolutely.
Okay, it's no. So, what next will Pakistan do?
Sandeep Unnithan: What does Asim Munir do next? That is going to be.
Gen P R Shankar: That's why I said coming back to the story. So, Pakistan will then use their hangars. They are going to get 8 hangars.
Yeah. I think the first one has been given to them and they will operationalize it and all that. Yeah.
So, what will Pakistan do? See, the only danger of this Mecca pact and now weaving the Mecca pact into this is this. The undersea deterrent.
Undersea deterrent Pakistan might develop with the help of Turkey funded by South East. Right. That's the only you know danger of the Mecca pact.
It might be one or two crude missiles. But it's difficult. Let me tell you at this point itself.
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