A battlefield innovation perfected in Ukraine which first emerged in 2024 is spreading defeating electronic jamming and taking an adversary by surprise. Fibre-optic drones are transforming warfare, leaving militaries racing to develop effective countermeasures. In fact, Russian forces demonstrated the drones’ effectiveness during Ukraine’s Kursk offensive in August 2024.

The territory Ukraine controlled in Kursk relied on a single logistical route running from the Ukrainian city of Sumy to the Russian town of Sudzha. This bottleneck served as an ideal proving ground for this new Russian weapon, a drone guided by fibre-optic cable. The first successful Ukrainian use was at the beginning of October 2024. Today they are being used extensively by both Russia and Ukraine.

Israel is now finding methods to counter this battlefield threat after Hezbollah’s growing use of fibre-optic drones which is fundamentally changing modern warfare. As per reports suggest Hezbollah is producing the drones locally using 3D printing and commercially available dual-use components.

Cheap, difficult to detect and immune to electronic jamming, these drones which were the defining weapons in Ukraine are now appearing in conflicts elsewhere, including Southern Lebanon.

On 26 April, the Israel Defense Force suffered its first known fatalities from a fibre optic drone when one soldier was killed and six others wounded after their position in southern Lebanon was struck. Hezbollah later released footage of the attack filmed by the drone. A screengrab taken from a video released by Hezbollah says to show an Israeli tank and soldiers gathered next to it moments before being hit by an FPV drone attack, in Taybeh, Lebanon.

According to reports, at least a dozen Israeli soldiers have since been killed by the drones after fighting in Lebanon resumed in March. A screenshot taken from a video released by Hezbollah shows an Israeli D9 armored bulldozer moments before being hit by an FPV drone attack, in Bint Jbeil, Lebanon, with the date of the video given as 15 April 2026.

Fibre -optic drones are equipped with a cable thinner than a fishing line that trails back to the operator, maintaining a physical connection rather than relying on radio signals. With no radio link for electronic warfare systems to jam, fibre -optic drones can operate in areas where conventional drones struggle or fail. The result is an effectively unjammable drone capable of striking at a range of   50 kilometers with pinpoint precision and a crystal-clear video feed. This is almost akin to the first generation ATGM’s but with greater ranges  

The cable acts as a cord between the operator’s control console and the drone, carrying commands and high-definition video without relying on radio signals that can be jammed.

Some drones can carry up to 50 kilometers of cable. Flying low, fast and almost silently, they are exceptionally difficult to detect, track or shoot down. Operators fly them to roadsides or likely avenues of approach before placing almost every onboard system into standby mode to conserve power. Because transmitting through fibre consumes far less energy than radio, the drone can wait for up to 24 hours while still “transmitting high-definition video. When a target appears, it launches its attack with only seconds of warning.

The drone does not emit an electromagnetic signal, its firing source cannot be geolocated, and being small, with small electric motors, flying close to the ground  its radar and infrared signature are minimal.

According to reports fibre drones now make up 70 percent of the enemy’s first-person-view drone attacks and cause more than half of overall casualties.

Although the extra weight of the fibre spool reduces the explosive payload, the drones remain effective against troops, light vehicles and defensive positions: “It’s best against manpower, light vehicles and ammunition and fuel dumps as their maneuverability makes them particularly dangerous.

As per reports from the battlefield in Ukraine they have been employed for going inside structures that are harder to reach, such as open doors of reinforced bunkers and enter tunnels which is not possible with a radio frequency drone.

The spread of the technology has triggered a search for effective countermeasures. In March, Britain’s Ministry of Defence sought novel ideas to detect and defeat fibre optically controlled uncrewed aerial systems.

NATO also launched an innovation challenge focused on detecting and defeating fibre-optic FPV drones, with winning entries ranging from artificial intelligence-enabled radar software to autonomous turrets and remote weapon stations.

Kinetic interception is particularly challenging due to the difficulty in the detection stages. There are several possible solutions against this threat, ranging from nets for passive defence, defensive drones that attack the threat, computerized sights that can be installed on assault rifles and mobile laser detection and interception systems.

Detection by electro-optical or acoustic sensors seems to be the most realistic means, although this type of detection provides a shorter warning time than radar detection.

Meanwhile, the countries in conflict are continue searching for immediate answers.

However, the technology is leaving another legacy across battlefields.

When the drones explode, the fibre cable remains strung across fields, forests and towns, creating vast webs of plastic waste. Vast swaths of Ukrainian farmland and forest are now littered with fiber-optic cables shed by drones. Images circulating on social media show landscapes blanketed with discarded strands.

There is an environmental cost. As. The Conflict and Environment Observatory’ in Ukraine warns that “Plastic pollution from fibre optic drones may threaten wildlife for years.

Like an abandoned fishing line, fibre optic cables could wraps itself around the necks of animals causing amputation, asphyxiation or starvation.” People and even vehicles have also become entangled in the cables.

In Kursk, this advantage proved consequential. Over seven months of fighting, Russian fibre-optic drones helped render Ukraine’s presence in the Kursk region increasingly unsustainable. Ukrainian forces ultimately withdrew back across the border in March 2025.

After Kursk, the trend soon spread. Fibre-optic drones began proliferating across other areas of the front and are now visible in Lebanon. By mid-2025, Ukraine moved to replicate and adapt the capability. Domestic production surged thanks to Ukraine’s agile ecosystem of innovative defense tech startups. What began as a Russian experiment has evolved into an innovation cycle. Fibre-optic drones are also Hezbollah's primary weapon against Israeli soldiers and civilians, along both sides of the Lebanese border, and are now seen as the biggest threat.

According to the Alma Research Centre, an Israeli think tank which monitors the conflict. The small drone (quadcopter) and particularly the FPV (First Person View) drone based on fibre-optic navigation has become the prominent weapon used by Hezbollah against IDF forces in southern Lebanon. According to them Israel's military assessment is that Hezbollah has dozens of trained drone operators and that it has accumulated a significant stockpile of the small, cheaply-made drones, which cost around $300-$400 each.

The fibre-optic drone, is definitely a game-changer. Compared with radio-frequency-controlled drones. It’s much harder to detect that it’s coming, and so it’s easier to be surprised and unable to react in time.

As the defence industry works on technological countermeasures, troops have been forced to rely passive measures such as mesh netting and even attempt shooting them down with rifles. But first they have to see the drones coming.

Lessons from the ongoing conflicts reveal that militaries relying exclusively on radio-controlled drones risk disruption at critical moments. Fibre-optic drones may not replace conventional systems, but they have established themselves as a durable component of the modern battlefield toolkit. New rules of the game are emerging regarding cost asymmetry wherein equipment costing hundreds of dollars is able to damage equipment costing millions of dollars and thereby tactical success is translating into limitation as far as freedom of action is concerned.

Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh, VSM (Retired)

Major General Jagatbir Singh is an Armoured Corps Officer who commanded the First Armoured Division. He served in varied terrains and tenanted important command, staff and instructional appointments including a UN Peace Keeping Mission in Iraq and Kuwait. He co-authored ‘Armour 1971’ and edited ‘Valour and Honour’.