In 1979, General Zia-ul-Haq found himself at the centre of the US effort against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In 2001, General Pervez Musharraf became a key US partner after the 9/11 attacks. And now, ‘Field Marshal’ Asim Munir has again emerged as an important interlocutor towards the US, as they face a wider crisis in West Asia.

Each of these crises were different.But the logic was similar. Pakistan’s geography, military establishment and nuclear capability gave Washington leverage in the region and thus an impetus to engage with Islamabad even when relations faced serious problems.

In 1979, Pakistan was under military rule and facing international criticism over Zia’s dictatorship and nuclear programme. The situation changed after Soviet forces entered Afghanistan that year. Washington needed Pakistan to support the Afghan resistance to counter Soviet expansion. Washington expanded covert assistance to the Mujahideen  and Pakistan became the primary channel for American aid. This transformed Zia’s position. Pakistan was no longer simply a military dictatorship facing international pressure. It had become a frontline state in the Cold War. The Afghan war expanded Pakistan’s intelligence and military establishment, owing to significant financial and arms inflows.

The second major shift came after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York. On September 11, 2001, two airplanes hit the twin towers killing thousands eventually, widely considered the worst terror attack in history. 

Back then Gen Pervez Musharraf had seized power in a coup in 1999. Pakistan was already under pressure after the Kargil conflict with India. But the attacks on the twin towers changed the strategic equation. The United States, once again needed access to Afghanistan and cooperation against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Musharraf accepted Washington’s demands. Pakistan provided access for US military and intelligence operations and assisted in the hunt for al Qaeda leaders. The 9/11 Commission noted that Pakistan also arrested hundreds of Al-Qaeda and Taliban members.

But the relationship was never straightforward. Pakistan had helped nurture the Taliban before 9/11. The 9/11 Commission also noted that sections of the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment remained ambivalent towards Islamist groups. After 9/11, Islamabad cooperated with Washington while also trying to avoid a wider confrontation with Taliban remnants. This created a contradiction that would later return to haunt Pakistan. The militant networks that had once served strategic purposes increasingly turned against the Pakistani state. The Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan, also known as the TTP, became a major internal security threat.

Ironically, Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks was traced in Abbottabad, Pakistan and his assassination in 2011 by the US forces further damaged trust between Washington and Islamabad. Yet geography continued to matter. Pakistan remained important because of its location next to Afghanistan and its wider position between South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.

This is where the idea of Pakistan as a “rentier state” becomes clear. Instead of generating enough resources through a strong domestic economic base, the country has repeatedly sought external assistance by making itself strategically useful. That pattern appears again in the current period.Pakistan has received 24 IMF bailouts, the latest being in September 2024. Pakistan is, however, trying to position itself between several competing powers. It has close ties with China and Saudi Arabia while also maintaining channels with Washington and Tehran. Munir’s recent engagement with the Trump administration has included discussions linked to the US Iran conflict and Pakistan’s possible role as a mediator.

This gives Pakistan another opportunity to present itself as indispensable. Its geography gives it access to multiple theatres. Its military gives it influence over foreign and security policy. Its nuclear status gives it additional strategic weight.

The question then is, what does Pakistan gain from this cycle in the long term. The country has repeatedly benefited from external crises. But those crises have also had serious domestic costs. The Afghan wars created militant networks that later contributed to violence inside Pakistan. Twenty-five years after 9/11, Al-Qaeda remains active in the region and the Pakistani Taliban or the TTP poses a serious domestic security challenge.

This remains the central irony. The same ecosystem that helped Pakistan gain strategic relevance also creates a security problem within the country.

For India, this pattern matters because every major international crisis can alter Pakistan’s strategic importance overnight. A Pakistan that appears economically weak or diplomatically isolated can suddenly become important when Washington needs access, mediation or military cooperation.

This explains why the Pakistani military establishment has repeatedly found opportunities in periods of global instability. Pakistan can sometimes appear to be both the firefighter and the beneficiary of the fire.

The three periods therefore tell a larger story. Zia rose in importance after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Musharraf gained a new lease of strategic relevance after 9/11. Munir now operates in another period of major geopolitical instability. The question is whether this cycle can continue.

Savio Rodrigues

Savio Rodrigues is a Research Analyst at Escape Velocity MediaWorks Pvt Ltd and writes for Chakra News on Defence, Geopolitics, National Security. He holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Mumbai.