Introduction

The Houthis have seized an opportunity amid the Iran War and their current offensive has its focus on the Bab Al-Mandab Strait.  Even though an Iranian spokesperson has said the Houthis are independent and do not take orders from anyone, most analysts are aware that they remain an Iranian proxy.

There is no doubt that the Memorandum of Misunderstanding and the recent rise in tensions in the Gulf have led to the Iranians to apply pressure elsewhere. The centre of gravity identified being Bab Al-Mandab, the narrow channel connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, which is a crucial route for global shipping and energy supplies. 

Also known as the Gate of Tears it is barely 30 kms at its narrowest and sees roughly 12 percent of global maritime trade pass through every day, while at least 90 percent of Europe-Asia internet capacity runs through cables laid along the same route.

Iran’s proxies, be it the Hamas, Hezbollah or Houthis have always offered Iran the advantage of plausible deniability. Iran can claim they act on their own. However, it has been reported that senior leaders from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps traveled to Sanaa to support the group. The capture of Mokha and the closing in on Bab Al-Mandab is part of a pattern of Iran’s escalation against Washington, while targeting Saudi Arabia. 

Yemen

The war in Yemen, remained largely frozen since a UN-brokered truce halted major fighting in 2022. However, the Houthi’s have  now launched a major offensive on the country’s Western coast. 

The UN has estimated that more than 80,000 people have been displaced in the past two weeks, including over 2,000 people who fled by boat to Djibouti.

The renewed fighting comes at a particularly volatile moment in the region. As the Houthis and Saudi Arabia directly exchange blows once again, they do so amid an intensifying Iran-US confrontation. 

On 11 September, the Houthi’s captured Perim, a strategic island in the Bab Al-Mandab, and have also captured Dhubab, a Red Sea coastal town facing Perim and Greater and Lesser Hanish. This has opened the possibility of them capturing territory overlooking the chokepoint. This would not only strengthen their position in Yemen but also enable them to threaten maritime traffic. 

Djibouti is approximately 20 kilometres from Perim Island. This places the Houthis with their drone, missile and maritime capabilities extremely close to a country that hosts US, Chinese, French, Italian and Japanese military bases. 

The Houthis benefited from surprise and military preparation. But the offensive also exposed the fragmentation of the anti-Houthi forces which include a variety of autonomous armed groups who were previously supported by different regional patrons and had competing political ambitions even as Saudi Arabia has tried to bring them under a more coherent command structure since early 2026.

Meanwhile, the Houthis used the period of relative calm following the 2022 truce to retrain, refit, rearm, recruit, improve domestic weapons production and expand their missile and drone capabilities. As a result, the Houthis now have more advanced capabilities than government forces in several areas.  

The Ansarullah movement already possesses the ability to threaten commercial vessels using missiles and drones, but gaining control of territory and coastline near the Strait would give it additional and potentially more effective options.    A direct fallout will be Iran gaining greater leverage in the wider regional crisis.

Impact on Saudi Arabia 

The renewed fighting has a direct impact on Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has spent the past several years trying to avoid being drawn back into the kind of direct military intervention that defined its military involvement in 2015 to restore the rule of Yemen’s government. But recent Houthi attacks on Southern Saudi Arabia, have damaged energy infrastructure and caused civilian casualties.  Saudi Arabia has responded with airstrikes. 

With the Strait of Hormuz closed due to the war, oil from Saudi’s Eastern oil fields near Abqaiq across the Arabian Peninsula to its Red Sea port of Yanbu, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. This pipeline transports up to 7 million barrels of crude per day to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, of which 2 million barrels feed refineries on the Western coast and 5 million are exported. This 1,200km pipeline has now been temporarily closed due to a drone strike traced to Maysan in Iraq.

Hence, they face a dilemma; allowing the Houthis to advance unfettered could strengthen a threat along its Southern border and around a vital international waterway. On the other hand, a major military response could revive a costly conflict that Saudi Arabia has spent years trying to avoid particularly amid the Kingdom’s focus on its Vision 2030 economic diversification program.

The US

The US, a close supporter of Saudi Arabia had reached a truce with the Houthis in May 2025, after conducting air strikes against the group following its attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. 

For the US, the recent Houthi advance creates a difficult choice. Trump has a close relationship with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and the US retains a fundamental interest in Saudi security. At the same time, Washington has strong incentives to avoid reopening a direct war with the Houthis. 

The Houthis equally do not want a repeat of the US air strikes which caused serious damage. This creates a peculiar situation: Washington and the Houthis both have reasons to avoid attacking one another, even while the Houthis increase pressure on one of the US’s closest regional partners. 

However, this equilibrium may not hold if the Houthis escalate attacks on Saudi territory and Washington could find itself pulled towards confrontation.

Further, Iran is wanting to put pressure on President Donald Trump before the midterm elections. Tensions in crucial global arteries will push up the price of crude, which will negatively affect the popularity of Trump and the Republicans. If the Republicans lose both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the entire war could be brought into question. It could also lead to investigations into the war by Congress. Though President Trump could exercise his executive powers to continue operations against Iran. But navigating a hostile political ecosystem to bring the conflict to a close will be challenging.

Conclusion 

In emerging conflicts, disrupting critical logistics infrastructure is often more strategically effective than conducting a conventional military invasion. Modern economies depend on uninterrupted trade and energy flows, making maritime chokepoints particularly attractive targets in hybrid warfare. 

Iran played the Strait of Hormuz card early in the war and saw the advantages. Has it now decided to play yet another of its Trump Cards? Iran and its proxies now have the capacity to exert pressure on two of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints.  These have now become part of the same strategic equation rather than separate security challenges.

There thus needs to be a coherent international approach to Yemen addressing the country’s political settlement with wider security issues in the Gulf, the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. 

The crisis in Yemen therefore needs to be contained as the stakes reach far beyond its borders.

Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh, VSM (Retired)

Major General Jagatbir Singh is an Armoured Corps Officer who commanded the First Armoured Division. He served in varied terrains and tenanted important command, staff and instructional appointments including a UN Peace Keeping Mission in Iraq and Kuwait. He co-authored ‘Armour 1971’ and edited ‘Valour and Honour’.